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Untangling the application of the EU Equality Directives at national level: a 
bottom-up approach 
Sara Benedi Lahuerta1 
Abstract 
Several EU-wide reports have identified obstacles for the effective application of the Race Equality 
Directive (‘RED’) and the Framework Equality Directive (‘FED’) at national level, but they do not ex-
plain why these obstacles arise. This paper seeks to provide additional tools to understand what may 
be the causes for the limited application of those directives at national level. On the basis of the the-
ory of the ‘social working of law’, developed by Griffiths, I present an analytical framework to explain 
why people follow anti-discrimination law -or not- and which choices they make when they suffer 
discrimination. I argue that the RED and the FED are mainly based on individual enforcement. There-
fore, the proposed framework analyses the decision-making procedure of individual victims of dis-
crimination, from the moment they suffer discrimination till they decide to bring a claim. It identifies 
the main factors playing a role in victims’ decisions, the barriers they may encounter in accessing the 
legal system and the role played by advice-providers, like equality bodies or NGOs. The paper also 
considers the limitations of such a framework for tackling the problem of institutional discrimination. 
1.  Introduction 
Several reports show that discrimination continues to be very widespread in the European Union 
(‘EU’). In a survey of the Fundamental Rights Agency (‘FRA’) focusing on the Roma, 47% of respon-
dents had suffered racial discrimination in the previous year2. In a survey concerning Muslims, 43% 
of respondents felt discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity or migrant origin and their re-
ligion3. In another report on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender population, half of the respo n-
dents had felt discriminated against in the previous year, on average.4  
Further research reveals that discrimination is not only sensed by victims, but also by their social en-
vironment. According to a 2012 special Eurobarometer, 34% of citizens living the EU had witnessed 
discrimination or harassment or had heard of it happening to someone in the previous year.5 56% of 
                                                           
1 Academic assistant at the College of Europe (Bruges) and PhD candidate at the University of Leicester. I am 
indebted to Dagmar Shiek, Michal Bobek and the participants of the workshop ‘EU non-discrimination law 
and policy – a future mandate?’ (University of Leeds, 5 December 2012) for valuable comments on earlier 
drafts. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 FRA, EU-Midis. Data in Focus Report I. The Roma (EUPO 2009) 4. Note that the respondents’ sample was lim-
ited to seven Member States (‘MS’) (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia). 
3 FRA, EU-Midis. Data in Focus Report II. Muslims (EUPO 2009) 5. The sample was composed of Muslims from 
14 MS (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden). 
4 FRA, European Union Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Survey. Results at a Glance (EUPO 2013). 
5 TNS Opinion & Social, Special Eurobarometer 393. Discrimination in the EU in 2012 (European Commission 
2012) 66. CELLS ONLINE PAPER SERIES, VOLUME 2  2013 
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respondents considered that racial discrimination was ‘widespread’ and 45% that discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, disability and age was also ‘widespread’.6 
These data indicate the persistence of discrimination and its wide social perception, but in some MS 
this is not reflected in the number of discriminatory incidents reported.7 In fact, underreporting is 
one of the typical reactions among victims.8 For instance, if we compare the 2010 figures of racist 
crimes9 of the three most populated MS which collect data,  there were 31,486 incidents reported in 
the UK,10 16,375 in Germany and only 1,352 in France.11 These three MS have probably different so-
cial dynamics, different ‘levels’ of racism, different proportions of ethnic groups and different proce-
dures for dispute resolution, which can explain differences in figures. But even taking into account 
these aspects, it is striking that the UK, with a population of 62.99 million inhabitants,12 registered 
31,486 incidents of racist crime, whilst France, with a population of 65.33 million, 13 registered only 
1,352. Can this mean that French society is more tolerant? Is it a consequence of using different reg-
istration systems for racist crime? Or can it also mean that only few racist crimes are registered? 
According to some reports, the scarcity of complaints is related to procedural, time and financial bar-
riers to access justice,14 but it also reflects a lack of awareness as regards anti-discrimination legisla-
tion, which is one of the main causes for underreporting.15 In a survey conducted by the FRA, about 
70% of respondents did not know that discrimination was prohibited when entering a restaurant or 
when renting or buying a flat.16 Similarly, in some MS up to 60% of respondents had not heard from 
equality bodies and up to 80% had not heard from other support organisations.17 In another report, 
the lack of awareness was mentioned as the main reason for underreporting by 36% of respondents, 
but the main reason was the lack of confidence in the legal system (63%).18 Other causes were vic-
                                                           
6 ibid 16. 
7 See eg FRA, EU-Midis. Data in Focus Report III. Rights Awareness and Equality Bodies (EUPO 2010) 11-12; 
Equinet, Tackling the “Known Unknown” How Equality Bodies Can Address Under-Reporting of Discrimination 
through Communications (Equinet 2012) 8-13. 
8 ibid. See also text to n 72-75. 
9 Whilst not all discriminatory incidents amount to a crime, due to the very limited availability of data on racists 
incidents for all MS, the data on racist crimes are used as an illustration. 
10 This figure refers only to England and Wales. 
11 FRA, Fundamental Rights: Challenges and Achievements in 2011 (EUPO 2012) 161. Whilst these data are in 
principle not comparable between different MS, they give a flavour of the different ways in which anti-
discrimination law operates in different MS. 
12 Eurostat, Basic Figures on the EU. Summer 2013 Edition (EUPO 2013) 4. 
13 ibid. 
14 I Chopin and E M Gounari, Developing Anti-discrimination Law in Europe. The 27 EU Member States Com-
pared (European Human Consultancy and MPG 2009) 61; FRA, Access to Justice in Europe: An Overview of 
Challenges and Opportunities (EUPO 2011) 38, 42. 
15 FRA, The Racial Equality Directive. Application and Challenges (EUPO 2012) 19-21, 
16 FRA, EU-Midis. Data in Focus Report III (n 7) 6. 
17 ibid 9. 
18 ibid 12. CELLS ONLINE PAPER SERIES, VOLUME 2  2013 
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tims’ resignation to suffer discrimination as part of their daily lives (40%),19 the fear to suffer retalia-
tion (26%) and time costs (21%).20 
These reports indicate that there are obstacles for the use of national laws implementing the Race 
Equality Directive (‘RED’)21 and the Framework Equality Directive (‘FED’)22 but they do not explain 
why these obstacles arise. This paper seeks to provide an analytical framework ascertaining what 
may be the causes for the limited application at national level of the RED and the FED. Whilst it is cer-
tainly very difficult to completely eradicate discrimination, analysing the practical use of the anti-
discrimination directives is a necessary first step to draw paths for improvement. 
In this article I suggest that the use of the RED and the FED at national level can largely be explained 
from a bottom-up perspective23 based on individual enforcement (section 2). After recognising the 
limits of this model (section 3), I analyse the main factors playing a role in the use of the RED and the 
FED (section 4), before drawing some concluding remarks (section 5). The paper takes an analytical, 
rather than a normative approach, aiming to provide a basis for potential socio-legal research which 
could draw normative conclusions. 
2.  Inverting the approach of anti-discrimination law 
As many other types of legislation, anti-discrimination law has often been designed from an instru-
mentalist perspective, whereby the legislator, imposes ‘commands’ on social actors to influence their 
behaviour and achieve certain aims.24 The legislator assumes that rules have ‘direct effects’ on citi-
zens, who will follow them, thereby bringing indirectly the desired results.25 Applying this logic to the 
                                                           
19 ibid. In another report, two thirds of the interviewees considered that it is not socially expected that victims 
of discrimination ‘take action’, see FRA, Access to Justice in Cases of Discrimination in the EU. Steps to further 
Equality (EUPO 2012) 55. 
20FRA, EU-Midis. Data in Focus Report III (n 7) 12. 
21 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between per-
sons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22. 
22 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16. 
23 The ‘bottom-up perspective’ refers to analysing the use of anti-discrimination law starting from a grass-root 
level  instead  of  looking  directly  at  litigation  rates.  This  implies  understanding  why  people  follow  anti-
discrimination law -or not- and which choices they make when they suffer discrimination. The idea of ‘bot-
tom-up’ does not relate to the concept of ‘bottom-up policy making’, which is outside the scope of this pa-
per. 
24 See generally J Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, or The Philosophy of Positive Law (first published 1879, R 
Campbell ed, 4th edn rev, John Murray 2002); L M Friedman, Law and Society: An Introduction (Prentice-Hall 
1977) 53; D J Galligan, Law in Modern Society (OUP 2007) 331. This approach has also been applied to anti-
discrimination law, see C McCrudden, ‘Regulating Discrimination: Advice to a Legislator on Problems Regard-
ing the Enforcement of Anti-Discrimination Law and Strategies to Overcome them’ in T Loenen and P R Rod-
rigues (eds), Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer 1999) and a critic in J Griffiths, ‘The 
Social Working of Anti-Discrimination Law’, in T Loenen and P R Rodrigues (eds), Non Discrimination Law: 
Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer 1999) 314.  
25 J Griffiths, ‘An introduction in eight propositions to the social working approach to legislation’ in N. Zeegers, 
W. Witteveen and B. van Klink (eds), Social and Symbolic Effects of Legislation Under the Rule of Law (The 
Edwin Mellen Press 2005) 7, 10.  CELLS ONLINE PAPER SERIES, VOLUME 2  2013 
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specific case of anti-discrimination law, the legislator presumes that after enacting equality legisla-
tion employers will not discriminate minorities in access to employment, so they will employ more 
ethnic minorities workers (direct effect), and as result, companies will have a more diverse workforce 
(indirect effect). 
However,  this top-down  approach  relies on  several  assumptions which  are  not  necessarily  true. 
Firstly, the legislator presumes that individuals will change their behaviour once the law is enacted. 
But to do so individuals need to be aware of the law and understand it,26 and they need to be able to 
tell when it applies.27 As Griffiths points, there are ‘two critical prerequisites for rule-following: 
knowledge and interpretation of the applicable facts and knowledge and interpretation of the appli-
cable rules’.28 Not least important, individuals need also to be willing to abide by the law.29 
Secondly, the fact that individuals follow the law does not directly entail that the pursued objectives 
will be met. If we take the same example, even if employers follow the RED and do not discriminate 
ethnic minorities in access to employment, it can be that only few members of ethnic minorities ap-
ply for jobs in a specific sector because they assume that they will be discriminated anyway or b e-
cause they consider that their qualifications do not  match the position requirements. Hence, the 
workforce will not become more diverse and the indirect goal will not be met. 
This shows that societies are complex and often intertwined with many different factors which have 
an impact on the use and effects of rules. Probably, not every individual will act following the rational 
pattern of the ‘carrot’ and the ‘stick’30 because they may be influenced by their moral beliefs,31 so-
cial environment, economic resources, or customs.32 Besides the contents of the law, the social re-
ception of the law is indeed a crucial factor for its mobilization.33  
To take account of the factors which may influence rule-following, I build on Griffiths’ work in the 
field of legal anthropology, particularly on his ‘social working of law’34 theory. Griffiths adopts a bot-
tom-up perspective for the analysis of rule-following on the basis of the concept of the ‘shop floor of 
social life’.35 The shop-floor is composed by a set of communities with their own internal organisa-
                                                           
26 See eg T Havinga, ‘The effects and limits of anti-discrimination law in The Netherlands’ (2002) 30 Interna-
tional Journal of the Sociology of Law 75, 84;  
27 cf FRA, The Racial Equality Directive (n 15) 20. 
28 J Griffiths, ‘An introduction in eight propositions’ (n25) 14. 
29 T R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale University Press 1990) 2-4. 
30 Friedman, Law and Society: An Introduction (n 24) 119-120. 
31 At this respect, see Tyler (n 29) 3-5. 
32 See some examples of the prevalence of informal over formal rules in Moore ‘Law and Social Change: The 
Semi-Autnomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study’ (1973) 7 Law & Soc’ Rev 719, 719; Ellickson, 
Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press 1991) 207. 
33 Galligan, Law in Modern Society (n 24) 333. 
34 See in general J Griffiths, ‘The Social Working of Legal Rules’ (2003) 48 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1; J Grif-
fiths, ‘An introduction in eight propositions’ (n25); Griffiths, ‘The Social Working of Anti-Discrimination Law’ 
(n 24) 313. 
35He defines it as ‘the place where the activities which the legislator would regulate are taking place’, Griffiths, 
‘Legal Pluralism and the Theory of Legislation – With Special Reference to the Regulation of Euthanasia’ in H 
Petersen and H Zahle, Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law (Darmouth 1995) 201, 208. CELLS ONLINE PAPER SERIES, VOLUME 2  2013 
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tion and rules, but it can also be influenced by other communities’ rules.36 These communities are 
called ‘semi-autonomous social fields’37 (‘SASFs’). A SASF can be a football team, a company, a gar-
dening association or simply a family or a group of friends. By focusing on the shop-floor, the social 
working of law studies to which extent anonymous individuals choose to make use of the law in their 
daily decisions38 or to face legal conflicts,39 if any. 
The analysis of rule-following from a bottom-up perspective led Griffiths to distinguish between 
three different types of uses of rules,40 which will be the starting point of our analysis. Right at the 
bottom he identified informal uses of rules, which take place when individuals apply rules spontane-
ously in their everyday relationships. They apply rules because they match their social and moral val-
ues or because they have ‘internalised’ them, even if they do not match their ‘inner convictions’.41 
Once they know about the existence of a rule, it will affect social actors’ behaviour, who will also 
build expectations about their counterparts’ actions.42 If a conflict arises, individuals may use a rule 
to solve it internally through negotiation, according to their respective bargaining powers.43 
A second category are organisational uses, which take place within private and public organisations, 
that is, SASFs which take the form of a legal person. All companies need to incorporate legal devel-
opments to their internal policies, for instance, by adjusting their recruitment procedures to anti-
discrimination law.44 However, it is usually easier to do it for large or publicly-owned companies than 
for SMEs because they tend to have human resources and/or compliance departments, which follow 
legal developments and implement them internally.45 Organisational uses of rules can either refer to 
the implementation of rules within an organisation or to the resolution of disputes internally within 
the SASF, by bringing the matter before the relevant authority within that organisation. 
Finally,  the  last  category  co nsists  of  uses  of  rules  before  administrative  or  judicial  authorities, 
through complaints and litigation. This is usually the only use which is considered in statistics and of-
ficial reports. It refers both to ex officio enforcement (ie claims which are brought at the initiative of 
                                                           
36 Moore (n 32) 720. 
37 Griffiths borrowed the concept of SASF from another legal anthropologist, Moore. See, respectively, Gri f-
fiths, ‘Legal Pluralism and the Theory of Legislation’ (n 35) 208; Moore, ibid 720. 
38 ibid 214. 
39 Griffiths, ‘The Social Working of Anti-Discrimination Law’ (n 24) 319. 
40 ibid. 
41 M Galanter, ‘The perplexities of legal effectiveness’ in N Zeegers, W Witteveen and B van Klink, Social and 
Symbolic Effects of Legislation Under the Rule of Law (Edwin Mellen Press 2005) XVII. 
42 ibid 320. 
43 At this respect, see also R Banakar, The Doorkeepers of the Law: A Socio-Legal Study of Ethnic Discrimination 
in Sweden (Darmouth 1998) 128. 
44 Griffiths, ‘The Social Working of Anti-Discrimination Law’ (n 34) 320. 
45 FRA, The Race Equality Directive. Application and Challenges (EUPO 2012) 20. An empirical study conducted 
in the Netherlands confirmed that public organisations incorporate equal treatment legislation better than 
private ones, and large organisations better than smaller ones, see Havinga (n 26) 86. CELLS ONLINE PAPER SERIES, VOLUME 2  2013 
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legal officials) or private enforcement, by individuals who are directly or indirectly affected by the 
norm.46 
Among these three types of uses of rules, informal uses are the ones which are quantitatively more 
important because they can take place at any moment, sometimes even in an unconscious way. Or-
ganisational uses are also quantitatively relevant but not as much as informal uses, as they require 
implementation procedures which may involve the participation of different persons  and depart-
ments and may raise organisational costs. Finally, complaints and litigation have a relatively low rele-
vance because they imply high costs in terms of time, money and social relations, which often d e-
tract individuals from starting legal actions.47 
Even if the social working of law brings attention to informal and organisational uses of rules, formal 
uses of rules should not be disregarded. Complaints and litigation are necessary ex post mechanisms 
to ensure that when the application of anti-discrimination law at informal and organisational levels 
fails, victims have legal devices to seek reparation and perpetrators can be sanctioned. 
3.  Building a rule-following model for the analysis of EU anti-
discrimination law 
3.1.   EU anti-discrimination law as an individual enforcement model 
The RED and the FED contain features which can help promote informal and organisational uses of 
anti-discrimination law, like the provision allowing positive action48 or the obligation to disseminate 
information,49 but both directives lean more clearly towards formal enforcement. The RED and the 
FED also comprise some group justice features, like the obligation to create a body ‘for the promo-
tion of equal treatment’,50 the duty to promote social dialogue51 or the possibility for legal entities 
to support individual claims,52 but the provisions on types of complaint procedures,53 legal stand-
ing,54 protection against victimisation,55 etc show that both directives rely principally on individual 
enforcement.56 
                                                           
46 In some countries, collective claims and active legal standing for legal entities may also be allowed. 
47 Griffiths, ‘The Social Working of Anti-Discrimination Law’ (n 24) 325. 
48 Art 5 RED and art 7 FED. 
49 Article 10 RED and art 12 FED. 
50 Art 13 RED. Note that this is only a requirement of the RED. 
51 Art 11 RED and art 13 FED. 
52 Art 7(2) RED and art 9(2) FED. 
53 Art 7(1) RED and art 9(1) FED. 
54 Art 7(2) RED and 9(2) FED. 
55 Art 9 RED and art 11 FED. 
56 See eg C McCrudden, ‘International and European Norms Regarding National Legal Remedies for Racial Ine-
quality’, in S Fredman (ed) Discrimination and Human Rights. The Case of Racism (OUP 2001) 252, 294-295; B 
Hepple, ‘Race and Law in Fortress Europe’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 1; M Bell, Racism and Equality in 
the European Union (OUP 2008) 67. CELLS ONLINE PAPER SERIES, VOLUME 2  2013 
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This approach was confirmed by the Firma Feryn
57 judgment, which concerned an employer’s public 
statement that he did not want to hire immigrants, without any specific person being identified as a 
victim of such policy.58 Following a teleological interpretation, the ECJ established that ‘victimless 
discrimination’59 is included in the concept of direct discrimination of article 2(2)(a) of the RED.60 It 
nevertheless considered that MS are not obliged to provide redress mechanisms if there is no identi-
fiable victim. Under article 7(2) of the RED, MS are only bound to allow legal entities with a legitimate 
interest to act ‘on behalf or in support’ of the victim, with her consent. Following AG Maduro61, the 
ECJ distinguished between the substantive contents of the RED and the enforcement provisions and 
pointed that the fact that ‘victimless discrimination’ was prohibited under the RED did not imply that 
the directive obliged to provide enforcement mechanisms to address it.62 The ECJ reminded that the 
RED sets only minimum requirements, meaning that MS can allow legal entities, like associations or 
equality bodies, to bring actio popularis without the existence of any identifiable victim, but they are 
not obliged to do it.63 
This reasoning poses problems because it entails the recognition of substantive rights for which en-
forcement mechanisms cannot be derived from EU law,64 but it confirms that the RED’s approach is 
mainly based on individual litigation. The ECJ seems not willing to push for an interpretation of article 
7 which could easily be considered contrary to the EU legislator’s will,65 and a similar conclusion can 
be drawn for the FED from the ruling in Asociaţia.
66 
Against this background, whilst acknowledging that discrimination has a collective dimension,67 this 
paper focuses mainly on the decision-making processes and uses of rules by the individual who suf-
fers discrimination. 
                                                           
57 Case 54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV [2008] ECR I-
5187. 
58 ibid, para 16. 
59 H Tissandier, ‘Une discrimination condammable même sans victime’ (2008) Revue de jurisprudence sociale 
885; R Krause, Case C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV 
[2008] ECR I-5187 (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 917, 923. 
60 In para 25 the ECJ stated that ‘*t+he existence of such direct discrimination is not dependant on the identifi-
cation of a complainant who claims to have been the victim’. 
61 Case 54/07, Firma Feryn (n 57) Opinion of AG Poaires Maduro, delivered on 12 March 2008, paras 12-14. 
62 Firma Feryn (n 57) para 26. 
63 ibid, paras 26-27. 
64 See comments in Krause, Case C-54/07 (n 59) 927-928; M Ambrus, M Busstra and K Henrard, ‘The Racial 
Equality Directive and Effective Protection against Discrimination: Mismatches between the Substantive Law 
and its Application’ (2010) 3 Erasmus Law Review 165, 168. 
65 The scope of that article was consciously limited by MS. A Tyson, ‘The Negotiation of the European Commu-
nity Directive on Racial Discrimination’ (2001) 3 European Journal on Migration and Law, 199-229. 
66 Case C-81/12, Asociaţia ACCEPT v Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării, judgment of 25 April 
2013, nyr. 
67 Individual discrimination can be a manifestation of underlying group disadvantages and institutional dis-
crimination, see F Brennan, ‘The Race Directive, Institutional Racism and Third Country Nationals’ in T Tridi-
mas  and  P  Nebbia  (eds),  European  Union  Law  for  the  Twenty-First  Century  (Hart    2004)  371,  377;  T 
Makkonen, ‘Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact. Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and the Legal Response thereto in 
 CELLS ONLINE PAPER SERIES, VOLUME 2  2013 
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3.2.   The bottom-up analytical model: from informal to formal effectiveness 
The starting point of the proposed theoretical approach will be an individual example. Consider the 
situation of two shopkeepers of a retail store, A and B. A is a Roma and was selected for the job 
among other equally qualified candidates thanks to a corporate programme to promote the integra-
tion of underrepresented ethnic minorities. Initially, A and B have a good relationship, but after some 
time a conflict arises because B starts harassing A. 
At the outset, anti-discrimination law was voluntarily followed by the retail store director, who hired 
A (organisational use), and it was also followed by A’s colleagues, who –unconsciously or not- treated 
him just as another employee (informal use). These types of uses of rules are what I have labelled as 
‘informal effectiveness’.68 This concept refers to situations where individuals, consciously or uncon-
sciously, abide the law in their private relationships, or when organisations take the necessary steps 
to enforce the law internally, without having recourse to third parties external to their SASF. 
After A is harassed by B, A has several ‘choices’. A first possibility would be trying to deal with the 
problem internally ‘negotiating’ with B, for instance by reminding B that harassment is unlawful and 
threatening B by reporting his conduct to the director. Depending on the relative bargaining power 
of A and B, A will be able to persuade B to cease his conduct and they will reach an ‘amicable adjust-
ment’. However, if the conflict remains, A may choose either to avoid the problem or just cope with 
it or seek the intervention of a third party within their SASF. In that case, A could report the problem 
to the director of the retail store. It is at this point that a ‘dispute’ arises. The director may either 
avoid the problem, or deal directly with it by applying the company’s internal code of conduct. Alter-
natively, he can bring the matter to the human resources department, which may then apply the in-
ternal code of conduct to sanction B.  
This example illustrates that victims of discrimination can choose between taking action or what Fel-
stiner calls ‘lumping’, that is, the choice to avoid and/or ignore the legal problem.
69 As Griffiths ex-
plains, victims often ‘prefer the options of “lumping it” (living with the injury, whatever it is), “avoid-
ance” (reducing the chance of future contact with the offending person) or “exit” from an existing re-
lationship’.
70 I will refer all these avoidance strategies as ‘social lumping’. 
At an empirical level, several studies indicate the existence of social lumping in the field of discrimi-
nation. The most comprehensive survey conducted EU-wide points that ‘not reporting discrimination 
is the norm’.71 Studies focusing in individual MS also flag the tendency to follow lumping strategies. 
In a study conducted in the UK, 35% of respondents confronted with discrimination would follow a 
lumping strategy.
72 In a similar study conducted in the Netherlands, 51.3% of victims of discrimin a-
tion (or related behaviours) did not take action against it or decided to ‘put up with it’.73 A Spanish 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Europe’ (PhD thesis, University of Helsinki 2010) 28. See also section 4.1. 
68 See Annex 1. 
69 W L F Felstiner, ‘Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing’ (1974) 9 Law & Soc’ Rev 63, 81. 
70 Griffiths, ‘The Social Working of Anti-Discrimination Law’ (n 34) 325. 
71 The report also points that the higher underreporting rates are found in Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Austria, 
Bulgaria and Lativa. See FRA, EU-Midis. Main Results Report (EUPO 2009) 50. 
72 See H Glenn, Paths to Justice. What People Do and Think about Going to Law (OUP 1999) 12. 
73 B C J Van Velthoven and M Ter Voert, ‘Paths to justice in the Netherlands: looking for signs of social exclu-
sion’ (2004) MPRA Paper 21296/2010, 16 <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21296/> accessed 20 January 
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2010 survey reveals that 94.3% of respondents who experienced discrimination did not report it.74 In 
Belgium, a report on discrimination among pregnant women at the workplace also identified lumping 
strategies.75 
Victims who decide not to take action may be influenced by their inner beliefs76, but also by external 
social factors arising within or outside the SASF, such as fear to victimisation, lack of confidence in 
the legal system, language barriers, etc.77 Victims may also be influenced by the feeling that it is not 
socially expected that they take action against discrimination.78  
If instead of lumping the victim tries to solve the problem internally with the aggressor or brings the 
matter before a SASF authority, we can still consider that we are within the remit of informal effec-
tiveness. However, if the internal claim within the company is not successful, the victim may choose 
again between social lumping or seeking the intervention of an external third party. Depending on 
the information available to the victim, she may choose to go for advice to a ‘filter’, that is, legal pro-
fessionals, NGOs, trade unions, equality bodies or other actors providing advice.79 The role of filters 
will be crucial because their advice may influence the victim’s decision to report discrimination (or 
not) and the type of action she takes. She may choose non-judicial procedures, like alternative dis-
pute resolution or administrative complaints, or judicial procedures. If the victim starts an adminis-
trative complaint before an equality body, she may decide not to take further legal actions, or if she 
is unsatisfied, she may decide to go on to the next stage and bring a claim before the employment 
tribunals. 
This second stage illustrates what I call ‘formal effectiveness’,80 which comes into play when the vic-
tim takes action through a structured legal procedure, be it going before a court or before an admin-
istrative authority. However, it also refers to the victim’s decision to seek advice from a third party 
(external to the SASF where discrimination occurred) to gather information about what to do next. If 
the victim goes to a filter first, the contents and timing of the advice will be determinant for the vic-
tim’s decision to start a formal legal procedure or not.81 The role and influence of filters is self-
evident if we consider that in a recent FRA survey one third of the respondents sought advice from 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2013. Note however that the study was replicated in 2009 and the percentage of lumpers decreased, see B C 
J  Van  Velthoven  and  C  M  Klein  Haarhuis,  Geschilbeslechtingsdelta  2009.  Over  verloop  en  afloop  van 
(potentieel) juridische problemen van burgers (WODC-publicaties 2010) 84, 223. 
74 RED2RED, Panel sobre discriminación por origen racial o étnico (2010): la percepción de las potenciales 
víctimas (Ministerio de Sanidad, Política Social e Igualdad 2011) 94. 
75 Quantitative data are not provided. L Lembrechts and E Valgaeren, Grossesse au travail. Le vécu et les obs-
tacles rencontrés para les travailleuses en Bélgique (P Zanoni dir, Institut pour l’Egalité des Hommes et de 
Femmes 2010) 99-100. 
76 Some victims believe that they do not need help, they do not want it; others perceive the incident as too 
trivial to be reported. See eg Equinet, Tackling the “Known Unknown” (n 7) 9-11. 
77 For more details see FRA, EU-Midis. Main Results Report (n 71) 54-56. 
78 FRA, Access to Justice in Cases of Discrimination in the EU (n 19) 55. 
79 For a similar approach and examples on the role of filters in discrimination disputes in several MS, see FRA, 
Access to Justice in Cases of Discrimination in the EU (n 19). 
80 See Annex 1. 
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legal experts before taking formal action and among them, ‘two thirds had received legal advice by 
the time they lodged their complaints’.82 
Even if victims eventually decide to take formal legal action, they may encounter institutional and 
systemic barriers to effectively pursue their actions. In fact, lumping can be a product of the legal sys-
tem itself due to two main reasons. Firstly, by deciding if a case is legally relevant or not, filters play a 
‘screening’ role.
83 The most obvious example is lawyers’ discretion in deciding whether they take a 
case or not,
84 but there are other examples. For instance, the procedure followed by Swedish O m-
budsmen to decide which cases are admissible
85 and the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC) policy to pick up the cases in which it exercises its litigation powers according to its strategic 
priorities.86 Accordingly, Ombudsmen, equality bodies and other legal actors often act as ‘doorkeep-
ers’ of the legal system when they select the cases which may enter the legal system.
87 
Secondly, some forms of discrimination are more subtle or complex and may not fit into the tests de-
veloped by administrative and judicial authorities to apply the law to the facts of a case. Sperino 
points that the ‘multipart tests’ (or ‘frameworks’) used for evaluating the facts of a discrimination 
claim ‘are overly influenced by *…+ the specific cases through which they were developed and are re-
sistant to change’.88 If we bear in mind that forms of discrimination have evolved over time from 
overt actions, like direct discrimination, to more subtle actions,89 like harassment, ‘the inflexibility of 
the framework model makes it unable to account for the full manifestations of discrimination’.90 For 
this reason, claimants may struggle to subsume the facts of their cases into a recognised structure, 
which may lead ‘courts to dismiss claims that straddle more than one framework or that do not fit 
neatly within recognized structures’.91 Consequently, these formal structures may impede victims’ 
access to formal procedures if they are not successful in reframing their cases following the patterns 
and the language of discrimination tests.92 I will refer to this phenomenon and to the ‘screening role’ 
of filters as ‘institutional lumping’ because, in contrast with social lumping, it does not arise from the 
social environment, but from the institutional framework itself. 
                                                           
82 FRA, Access to Justice in Cases of Discrimination in the EU (n 19) 50. 
83 R L Sandefur, ‘The Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and Non-Legal Institutions of Remedy’ 
(2009) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 949,957. 
84 ibid. 
85 Banakar (n 43) 30-31.  
86  EHRC,  Strategic  litigation  policy  2012-13.  Appendix  2  <http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/legal-and-
policy/legal-strategy/> accessed 20 April 2013. 
87 Banakar (n 43) 30. 
88 S. F Sperino, ‘Rethinking Discrimination Law’ (2011-2012) 110 Michigan Law Review 69, 70. 
89 ibid, 125; S Sturm, ‘Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A structural Approach’ (2001) 101 Co-
lumbia Law Review 458. 
90 Sperino (n 88) 125. 
91 ibid 71; cf with Banakar’s concept of ‘re-labelling’, Banakar, (n 43) 85-86, 100. Both Sperino and Banakar 
seem to suggest that these processes are ‘doorkeeping techniques’ which end up framing how formal action 
against discrimination works and condition which cases enter the legal system. 
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A key difference between formal and informal effectiveness is that formal effectiveness is always ex 
post because the formal machinery only starts working if there has been a discrimination incident, 
and in most cases, only if the victim is brave enough ‘to push the start button’ to initiate some type 
of legal procedure. On the contrary, informal effectiveness can either be ex ante, when the law is re-
spected and there is no discrimination, or ex post, when the law has not been respected but the con-
flict is solved before it is externalised. 
4.  Shortcomings of the bottom-up model based on individual enforce-
ment 
4.1.   Institutional discrimination 
As stated earlier, this theoretical model is mainly based on the use of anti-discrimination rules at an 
individual level. The model describes the decision-making processes and the legal structures that a 
victim of discrimination is confronted with when facing a particular incident. However, discrimination 
can be a diffuse phenomenon affecting a whole group, which may be difficult to associate with a 
specific action and a concrete person. It is thus not always possible to pinpoint a specific incident. 
This type of discrimination has been called institutional discrimination,93 discrimination by omis-
sion94 or third-generation discrimination.95 It has been described as ‘an attitude on the part of the 
State which consists in not taking the necessary measures to prevent situations of discrimination’,96 
especially as regards certain areas of life, like education, housing or access to healthcare. It can be 
the result from ‘a lack or shortage of adequate resources’, or from ‘ill will’ and ‘selective attitudes’97 
based on stereotypes and prejudices, which in the long run can lead to social exclusion, victimisation 
and group disadvantages.98 
In Europe, and more precisely in the UK, institutional discrimination came to the public attention 
with the murder of Stephen Lawrence in London in 1993. Lawrence’s family campaigned to show 
that the police did not properly investigate the murder due to the victim’s ethnic background. This 
case showed the underlying tensions between police forces and black people in the UK of the 1980s 
and 1990s99 and fed public debate about institutional discrimination. The McPherson Inquiry, which 
                                                           
93 This term is commonly used in the UK. See Sir W Macpherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: report of an 
inquiry (Home Office 1999); C McCrudden, ‘Institutional Discrimination’ (1982) 2 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies; M Bell, ‘British Developments in Non-Discrimination Law: the Equality Act’, in R Schulze (ed), Non-
Discrimination  in  European  Private  Law  (Mohr  Siebelk  2011)  209, 
211.303.<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.194.6625&rep=rep1&type=pdf>  ac-
cessed 10 June 2012;  
94  A  Amor,  Racial  discrimination,  religious  intolerance  and  education,  3  May  2001,  UN  doc. 
A/CONF.189/PC.2/22, paras 93-100. 
95 This is the term used by some American scholars. See G de Búrca, ‘Stumbling into Experimentalism: The EU 
Anti-Discrimination Regime’ in C. F Sabel and J. Zeitlin (eds), Experimnetalist Governance in the European 
Union: Towards a New Architecture (OUP 2010) 218, citing S Sturm, ‘Second Generation Employment Dis-
crimination: A structural Approach’ (2001) 101 Columbia Law Review 458. 
96 Amor (n 94) paras 93-100. 
97 ibid. 
98 See eg C McCrudden, ‘Institutional Discrimination’ (n 93). 
99 J Foster, T Newburn and A Souhami, Assessing the impact of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Study 294 (Home 
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focused on this specific murder but also on a more general appraisal of relations between police 
forces and ethnic minorities, concluded that the police investigation was faulty due to ‘professional 
incompetence, institutional racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers’.100 Thanks to the 
Lawrence case both public authorities and the public opinion became aware of the problem of insti-
tutional discrimination in the UK.101 
More recently, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) accepted as evidence of discrimination 
the fact that a disproportionate number of Roma pupils were placed in special primary schools the 
Czech Republic.102 Whilst these schools were meant to be –in theory- for any children with special 
needs, Roma children were more likely to end up in special schools –in practice.103 The so called ‘Os-
trava case’ was mainly based on statistical evidence collected by the European Roma Rights Centre 
(‘ERRC’)104 but it could only be brought before the ECtHR thanks to the joint application of 18 indi-
viduals.105 Thus, if it had not been for those individuals’ readiness to bring an application together 
and for the statistics collected by the ERRC, the underlying situation of institutional discrimination 
would probably not have reached the tribunals. The Ostrava case can thus be considered a successful 
example of individuals being able to bring issues of institutional discrimination before the judicature, 
but it was in fact part of a wider collective strategy supported by NGOs, like the ERRC.106 The ECtHR 
actually acknowledged this collective element by stating that national legislation ‘had a dispropor-
tionately prejudicial effect on the Roma community’ and not considering it necessary to examine the 
applicants’ individual cases.107 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Office 2005) 1. 
100  See  The  Stephen  Lawrence  Inquiry:  report  of  an  inquiry  (Home  Office  1999)  para  45.24. 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hors294.p
df> accessed 28 May 2013. 
101 See eg H Khaleeli, ‘Twenty years after Stephen Lawrence's murder, what's changed?’, The Guardian (Lon-
don,  21  April  2013)  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/apr/21/twenty-years-stephen-lawrence-murder-
whats-changed> accessed 28 May 2013. 
102 D.H. v. the Czech Republic App no 57325/00 (ECtHR, 13 November 2007). 
103 In the city of Ostrava, only 1.8 % of non-Roma pupils were placed in special schools, whilst 50.3 % of Roma 
pupils were, ibid, para 18. 
104 D Strupek, ‘Before and after the Ostrava case: Lessons for Anti-Discrimination Law and Litigation in the 
Czech Republic’ *2008+ Roma Rights Journal 42. 
105 Under article 34 of the European Convention of Human Rights, applicants need to be the victims of the 
breach of at least one of its articles, see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) App no 36813/97 (ECtHR, 29 March 2006) 
para179. Furthermore, actio popularis are not permitted, see Klass and Others v. Germany App no 5029/71 
(ECtHR, 6 September 1978) para 33. 
106 cf J A Goldston, ‘The role of European anti-discrimination law in combating school segregation: the path 
forward after Ostrava’, speech delivered at the conference Roma and equal access to education: from segre-
gation  to  integrated  schooling,  Brussels,  28  -  29  April  2006  <http://www.enar-
eu.org/Page.asp?docid=16034&langue=EN> accessed 28 May 2013. See also Sampanis and Others v Greece 
App no 32526/05 (ECtHR, 5 June 2008); Orsus and Others v Croatia App no 15766/03 (ECtHR,16 March 2010); 
Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary App no 11146/11 (ECtHR, 29 January 2013) and Lavida and Others v Greece App 
no 7973/10 (ECtHR, 30 May 2013). 
107 D.H. and Others (n 102) para 209. Farkas considers that this ruling ‘virtually transformed D.H. and Others 
from an application brought by eighteen individual applicants *…+ into an actio popularis or collective com-
plaint’, L Farkas, ‘Limited Enforcement Possibilities under European Anti-Discrimination Legislation – A Case 
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Institutional discrimination is a ‘collective failure’ which can be perceived ‘in processes, attitudes and 
behaviour*s+’,108 and may –or may not- emerge as a specific discriminatory incident. Due to this col-
lective aspect, individual justice models tend to offer limited possibilities to address it effectively. 
Makkonen, for instance, criticizes individual enforcement because it ‘hides from sight structural and 
institutional problems that cannot be seen by looking at individual events alone. [T]he episodic view, 
just like the law, is only concerned with specific events *…+ and is unconcerned with the more general 
mechanisms,  patterns,  causes  and  consequences  that  underlie  or  contribute  to  the  specific 
events’.109 
However, whilst acknowledging that individual complaints cannot successfully combat institutional 
discrimination on their own, they can play a role as part of a broader strategy, together with other 
measures.110 Individual complaints are not completely useless in tackling institutional discrimination 
and can trigger other type of more effective policies. As the above mentioned examples suggest, if 
discrimination materialises in a concrete case, individual complaints can raise a wareness and can 
push states to take measures to address the problem, beyond the individual case. 111 This can be 
true, even if the final ruling is unfavourable to the victim, especially if civil society organisations are 
strong and well organised.112 Civil society can try to ‘activate the courts’
113 and feed discussion and 
public debate about the public authorities’ failure to address group disadvantages (‘shaming’)
114 and 
they may be able to push for policy and legal change (‘reframing’).
115 The Ostrava case can be seen as 
an example of activating the ECtHR, which has led the Czech Government to take steps to tackle 
Roma segregation in education.116 
The proposed model only partially addresses institutional discrimination. Policies which target this 
type of discrimination can lead to informal and organisational uses of anti -discrimination law, and 
strategic litigation can fall within the remit of formal uses. However, if institutional discrimination 
does not materialise in specific cases, it would fall outside of the scope of the model.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Study of Procedural Novelties: Actio Popularis Action in Hungary’ (2010) 3 Erasmus Law Review181, 188.  
108 The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: report of an inquiry (n 100) para 6.34. 
109 T Makkonen, ‘Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact. Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and the Legal Response 
thereto in Europe’ (n 67) 28. 
110 N Bamfroth, M Malik and C O’Cinneide, Discrimination Law: Theory and Context (Thomson 2008) 336-337. 
111 That was the case after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. 
112 Goldston (n 106). 
113 A S Sweet, ‘The European Court of Justice’ in P Craig and G De Burca, The Evolution of EU Law (2
nd edn, OUP 
2011) 121, 145. 
114 D Panke, ‘The European Court of Justice as an Agent of Europeanization? Restoring Compliance with EU 
Law’ (2006) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 847, 852. 
115 ibid 853. 
116 However, the results of these measures are still limited, see  OSCE, Equal Access to Quality Education for 
Roma  Children.  Field  Assessment  Visit  to  the  Czech  Republic  (OSCE  2012) 
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4.2.  Filters may play an active rather than a passive role 
Another limitation of the theoretical model lies in the fact that it is not always victims who take the 
initiative of contacting filters; filters can also play an active role.117 In some cases NGOs may contact 
discrimination victims after learning about their case through the media. Filters may also identify a 
specific situation where discrimination is patent and set up a strategy to produce evidence which 
would allow bringing the matter to courts. They may try to gather statistical evidence118 or set up 
testing strategies. For instance, following a testing strategy an NGO managed to demonstrate di s-
crimination suffered by migrants in access to housing in the city of Bilbao (Spain).119 Filters can also 
play an active role in helping victims to recognise situations of discrimination or persuading them to 
bring a claim. 
  The presented framework assumes that it is the victim who will contact filters, so formal uses 
of rules triggered by filters’ active search for complainants fall outside the scope of the model. How-
ever, when filters take the initiative to organise awareness raising campaigns, they can fall within the 
remit of informal uses of rules. 
5.  Factors playing a role in the use of EU anti-discrimination law 
The analytical model presented explains how individuals use anti-discrimination law, either by re-
specting it at an informal level, or by having recourse to enforcement mechanisms when the law is 
breached. The model highlights not only how the rules are used, but also what are the obstacles to 
the use of anti-discrimination law. This section adds some flesh to the bones of the model by briefly 
analysing the factors which may play a role in the use of EU anti-discrimination law.120 
Firstly, the use of anti-discrimination law depends on  individuals’ awareness of rules.121 Citizens 
need to know about the existence of norms, their contents and how they can be relevant to their 
particular situation to adjust their ‘legal behaviour’.122 Legal knowledge depends largely on the par-
ticular circumstances of each individual, ie its profession, age, social sphere, civil status, etc.123 Mass 
media can play a role in informing individuals about the contents of legislation, but research shows 
that most victims who were are aware of the existence of anti-discrimination law learned about it at 
school or university (50%) and to a lesser extent, from friends, family, the internet or ‘common cul-
                                                           
117 A FRA report suggests that filters, especially NGOs, counselling institutions and equality bodies, are rela-
tively active, whilst lawyers are less active in seeking complainants. See FRA, Access to Justice in Cases of Dis-
crimination in the EU (n 19) 54. 
118 For example, the Ostrava case was started on the initiative of the ERRC and other organisations. See ERRC, 
Interrights and MPG (n 146) 80. 
119 Sos Racismo Vizcaya, Discriminación y acceso a la vivienda de las personas inmigrantes en Bilbao (n p; 
2011). 
120 This is not intended to be an exhaustive enumeration. 
121 See eg Moore (n 32) 744; Griffiths, ‘The Social-Working of Anti-discrimination Law’ (n 24) 316-317; Havinga 
(n 26) 83-84; FRA, The Race Equality Directive (n 45) 19-20. 
122 Friedman (n 24) 111-115.  
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ture’.124 Some were also aware about anti-discrimination law because it is linked to their work or 
they had been active in trade unions and NGOs.125 
Secondly, besides knowing the law, potential users must be able to recognise when they can make 
use of it. 126 This requires having the relevant information, ie that they were not accepted for a job 
on the ground of their ethnicity. As the ECJ judgments in Meister127 and Kelly128 suggest, this infor-
mation may not be easily accessible because the alleged perpetrator may not be willing to disclose it. 
In addition, victims must be able to interpret the factual information as falling within the scope of the 
relevant rule. Empirical research shows that individuals often have difficulties in labelling a set of 
facts as being discriminatory, and in some cases it is thanks to family members and friends that they 
are able to do it.129 Indeed, the same way that consumers may ‘fail to recognize that the product 
they receive is defective’,130 discrimination victims may fail to realise that they were not accepted as 
a tenant of a flat for their foreign accent or their skin colour.131 
Thirdly, the use of anti-discrimination law is influenced by the internal values and rules of SASFs. At 
an informal level, the more anti-discrimination law is in line with SASFs’ values and inner believes of 
individuals, the more it will be spontaneously applied.132 This does not necessarily imply that anti-
discrimination law should have the ‘pedagogical’ role of shaping people’s minds,133 but rather that 
the use of rules may be different in each MS,134 depending on whether ‘otherness’ is more easily ac-
cepted or not.135 The use of anti-discrimination law will also vary according to SASFs’ capacity to in-
tegrate norms, or on the contrary, to create resistance to them if they are in conflict with other 
SASFs’ internal norms.136 For instance, anti-discrimination law can easily clash with public security 
rules, if we think of Muslim women wearing burkas,137 or with the freedom of contract,138 if we 
                                                           
124 FRA, Access to Justice in Cases of Discrimination in the EU. Steps to further Equality (n 19) 53. 
125 ibid. 
126 See inter alia Moore (n 32)744; Griffiths, ‘The Social-Working of Anti-discrimination Law’(n 24) 316-317; 
Havinga (n 26) 83-84; FRA, The Race Equality Directive (n 45) 19-20. 
127 C-415/10 Meister, judgment of 19 April 2012, nyr,  
128 C- 104/10 , Patrick Kelly v National University of Ireland (University College, Dublin), judgment of , 21 July 
2010, nyr. 
129 FRA, Access to Justice in Cases of Discrimination in the EU (n 19) 51. 
130 S Macaulay, ‘Lawyers and Consumer Protection Law’ (1979-1980) 14 Law & Soc’ Rev 115,121. 
131 FRA, The Race Equality Directive (n 45) 20. 
132 See text to n 41. 
133 A Somek, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti-Discrimination Law (OUP 2011) 13-15. 
134 It will also be vary between different SASFs located in the same country, ie between different companies, 
associations, etc. 
135 This is one of the reasons why levels of complaints and litigation should not be compared between MS. 
136 See eg Havinga (n 26) 85-86 building on Moore (n 36). 
137 See eg J Heider, ‘Unveiling the Truth Behind the French Burqa Ban: The Unwarranted Restriction of the 
Right to Freedom of Religion and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 22 Indiana International & 
Comparative Law Review 93. 
138 See a discussion in D Schiek, ‘Freedom of Contract and a Non-Discrimination Principle – Irreconcilable An-
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think of a landlord not willing to rent his flat to migrants. These clashes are likely to create resistance 
for rule-following. 
Fourthly, the relative bargaining power of social actors within SASFs is also relevant, both at the in-
formal and the formal level. To take action victims need not only to recognise the situation and be 
aware of the law, but also to feel ‘empowered’ to do something about it.139 Empowerment can arise 
from the victim’s self-belief that she has ‘sufficient power to achieve a solution’140 or from external 
support provided by family, friends, colleagues or filters.141 The relative bargaining power of indi-
viduals inside the relevant SASF will thus be determinant for the victim’s decision to address dis-
crimination informally or to take formal action, and it may also affect the result of the dispute.142 
Victims are likely to have a low subjective power if they belong to a vulnerable community or when 
discrimination takes place in fields like employment or education, where the perpetrator can be a 
superior or a teacher.143 When the subjective power of victims is low, external support can be crucial 
to overcome fear to victimisation and the stress derived from complaint procedures.144 
Fifthly, filters are crucial actors for rule-following. As stated above, they can play a role at the infor-
mal level by conveying information and raising awareness. This can be achieved not only through in-
formation campaigns, but also by feeding public debate,145 for instance by catching the press atten-
tion through strategic litigation.146 At a formal level, filters can play a ‘screening role’ by selecting 
which discrimination cases are legally relevant, and leaving others outside the legal system.147 Con-
versely, they can also have a ‘push effect’, by supporting morally and financially victims to take legal 
action,148 thus preventing social lumping. However, the role of filters can vary depending on th eir 
human and material resources and to their geographical presence.149 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
tonyms?’, in T Loenen and P R Rodrigues (eds), Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer 
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Sixthly, the use of rules at an organisational level can also depend on the existence of promotion 
programmes. Public policies can be launched to grant financial or material advantages to companies 
who hire a certain percentage of employees from a specific vulnerable community.150 However, they 
can also be implemented at the initiative of companies themselves, as part of their internal policies, 
or to improve their public image. 
Finally, time and financial costs151 and formalistic legal frameworks can also have an influence in 
formal uses of rules. As discussed earlier, legal frameworks can hinder individuals’ access to the legal 
system, especially as regards subtle and covert forms of discrimination, which may be difficult to 
subsume in anti-discrimination tests.152 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper proposes an analytical model to decode how the RED and the FED are effectively used at 
national level. Without seeking to explain comprehensively the use of rules as regards a phenome-
non as complex as discrimination, it brings the attention to a number of elements which can at least 
partially explain the application and effects of both directives at national level. 
Following the RED and the FED approach to enforcement, which is largely based on individual litiga-
tion, the proposed model takes a bottom-up approach by focusing on how individuals apply anti-
discrimination law spontaneously in their daily lives or within a given organisation (informal effec-
tiveness). It also considers the decision-making processes that victims of discrimination follow to de-
cide whether to seek advice and bring a complaint (formal effectiveness). 
As regards informal effectiveness, the use of the directives is influenced by the social values and the 
internal rules of relevant communities. Differences in the application of the RED and the FED be-
tween MS can thus partly be explained by the existence of favourable or unfavourable social condi-
tions at national level. For instance, the fact that some national legal orders enshrine more strongly 
than others legal principles which can clash with anti-discrimination law, may reduce its use at an in-
formal level.  
As regards formal effectiveness, victims may be confronted with a number of obstacles which may 
dissuade them to seek for advice from filters and from bringing legal actions (social lumping). Victims 
may be influenced by their inferior position as regards the perpetrator, especially if they belong to 
socially excluded groups or the perpetrator is a superior. They can also fail to have the necessary 
economic and moral support to bear the psychological and economic cost of lengthy legal proce-
dures. Even if the victim takes action, the screening role of filters and the legal system’s selective 
procedures may still leave their cases out of the legal system (institutional lumping). 
This analysis suggests that the evaluation of the effects of the RED and the FED needs to be based 
not only on formal procedures and litigation rates, but also on socio-legal analysis of the extent to 
which the directives are used at all social levels. The use of the directives at informal and organisa-
tional levels can be crucial to understand how they work in practice and why litigation rates are so 
low in some MS. The fact that litigation rates are low can be due to social and institutional lumping, 
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but it can also be a sign that they are being used successfully at informal and organisational levels. A 
broader consideration to the diversity of MS legal systems would be needed to develop further this 
analytical model and comprehend better how the RED and the FED work in practice.   CELLS ONLINE PAPER SERIES, VOLUME 2  2013 
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ANNEX 1.  
FORMAL AND INFORMAL EFFECTIVENESS IN EQUALITY LAW 
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